State of Utah v. Donald Arthur Farquharson : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1989
State of Utah v. Donald Arthur Farquharson : Brief
of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
John O. Christiansen; attorney for appellant.
R. Paul Van Dam; attorney general; Charlene Barlow; assistant attorney general; attorneys for
respondent.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Farquharson, No. 890260 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1829
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS UT>\H &&&•' 
K F y " 
5Q STATE OF UTAH, ,; : 
j/„ ' Plaintiff-Respondent, : 
L
'
Jo
'
4|
:i' NO. — S ^ ^ g ^ / s 
DONALD ARTHUR FARQUHARSON, : 
Defendant-Apellant. : 
Case No. 890260-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF ATTEMPTED MURDER, 
A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH 
CODE ANN. §§ 76-4-101, 76-5-201, and 76-5-202 
(1978) (Supp. 1988), IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE J. PHILIP EVES, 
JUDGE, PRESIDING. 
JOHN O. CHRISTIANSEN 
P.O. Box 1468 
Beaver, Utah 84713 
Attorney for Appellant 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
CHARLENE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
JUN 211989 
CO'jH'i Or- A '"LMH 
11 1 1 1 IE "I JTA 1 1 C0UR1 Of APPEALS 
STATE CT" ""*» I I, t 
P1 a I n 11 f f - R e s p o n d e n t : 
v . t 
DON All 11 ni 'i J 11 11 i A t < t1 LI t i A K 5 u N , 
Defendant-Apellant. : 
Case No 890260-CA 
111 I '1)1.1 I j M l 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM A EVICTION OF ATTEMPTED MURDER, 
A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH 
CODE ANN. §§ 76-4-101, 76-5-201, and 76-5-202 
(1976) (Supp. 1988), IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAI, 
DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE J, PHILIP FT-*^ S, 
JUDGE, PRESIDING, 
A f t r r r f»**a 1 
236 Capitol 
Salt Lake City , I It .nh H < M l 4 
Attorneys for Respondent 
JOHN 0 . CI II USTIANSEN 
P.O. Box 1468 
Beaver,, Utah 84 ; J 3 
Attorney for Appel lant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 9 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS 
SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE JURY'S 
VERDICT CONVICTING DEFENDANT OF 
ATTEMPTED MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE 10 
POINT II THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN 
REFUSING TO PERMIT THE DEFENDANT 
TO SHOW HIS SCARS TO THE JURY 13 
CONCLUSION 17 
i-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Page 
State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591 (Utah 1988) 10 
State v. Grueber, No. 870532-CA, Slip Opinion at 10 
(Utah App. June 2, 1989) 10, 12 
State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91 (Utah 1982) 12 
State v. Hutchison, 655 P.2d 635 (Utah 1982) 15 
State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811 (Utah 1977) 12 
State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1352 (Utah 1977), cert, 
den. Pierre v. Utah, 439 U.S. 882, 99 S.Ct. 219, 
58 L.Ed.2d 194 (1978) 13-15 
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983) 10 
State v. Renzo, 21 Utah 2d 205, 443 P.2d 392 (1968) 14 
State v. Urias, 609 P.2d 1326 (Utah 1980) 15 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987) 10 
State v. Watts, 675 P.2d 566 (Utah 1983) 10 
State v. Wells, 603 P.2d 810 (1979) 14 
CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-203 (1978) (Supp. 1988) 2-3, 5 
Utah Code Ann. §76-4-101 (1978) (Supp. 1988) 1-2, 4 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-103 (1978) 3, 5 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-201 (1978) (Supp. 1988) 1, 3-4 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-202 (1978) (Supp. 1988) 1, 4 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-30 (1982) 2 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-2 (1987) (Supp. 1988) 1 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3 (1987) (Supp. 1988) 1 
Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a) 2, 15 
Utah R. of Evid. 401 2 
Utah R. of Evid. 402 2 
Utah R. of Evid. 403 2, 14 
-iii-
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ; 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 890260-CA 
v. : 
DONALD ARTHUR FARQUHARSON, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction for Attempted Murder 
in the first degree, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-4-101, 76-5-201, and 76-5-202 (1978) (Supp. 
1988). The appeal was originally filed in the Utah Supreme Court 
which had jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-2(3)(i) (1987) 
(Supp. 1988). By order dated May 2, 1989, the Supreme Court 
transferred this case to the Utah Court of Appeals, which has 
jurisdiction to hear the case under Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-
3(2) (j) (1987) (Supp. 1988). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether there is sufficient evidence to support the 
jury's verdict convicting defendant of attempted murder in the 
first degree, where defendant, while being apprehended by a peace 
officer, drew a loaded handgun and turned the weapon on the 
officer, but claimed at trial that he was attempting to commit 
suicide. 
2. Whether the trial court committed error in refusing 
to allow the defendant to show the scars on his arm and hand 
which were caused by bullets fired at the defendant by the peace 
officer. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
For purposes of this brief, respondent relies on the 
following provisions: 
1. Rule 30(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-35-30 (1982): 
Any error, defect irregularity or variance 
which does not affect the substantial rights 
of a party shall be disregarded. 
2. Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence: 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence. 
3. Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence: 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except 
as otherwise provided by the Constitution of 
the United States or the Constitution of the 
state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or 
by other rules applicable in courts of this 
state. Evidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible. 
4. Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
5. Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-203 (1978) (Supp. 1988): 
A person who has been convicted of a felony 
may be sentence to imprisonment for an 
indeterminate term as follows: 
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(1) In the case of a felony of the 
first degree, for a term at not less than 
five years, unless otherwise specifically 
provided by law, and which may be for life 
but if the trier of fact finds a firearm 
or a facsimile or the representation of a 
firearm was used in the commission or 
furtherance of the felony, the court shall 
additionally sentence the person convicted 
for a term of one year to run 
consecutively and not concurrently; and 
the court may additionally sentence the 
person for an indeterminate term not to 
exceed five years to run consecutively and 
not concurrently; . . . 
6. Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1978): 
Attempt—Elements of offense. — (1) For 
purposes of this part a person is guilty of 
an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with 
the kind of culpability otherwise required 
for the commission of the offense, he engages 
in conduct constituting a substantial step 
toward commission of the offense. 
7. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1978): 
Aggravated Assault.—(1) A person commits 
aggravated assault if he commits assault as 
defined in section 76-5-102 and: 
(a) He intentionally causes serious 
bodily injury to another; or 
(b) He uses a deadly weapon or such means 
or force likely to produce death or serious 
bodily injury. 
(2) Aggravated assault is felony of the 
third degree. 
8. Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-201 (1978) (Supp. 1988): 
Criminal Homicide—Elements—Designations of 
offenses. 
(1) A person commits criminal homicide if 
he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with 
criminal negligence, or acting with a mental 
state otherwise specified in the statute 
defining the offense, causes the death of 
another human being, including an unborn 
child. There shall be no cause of action for 
criminal homicide against a mother or a 
physician for the death of an unborn child 
cause by an abortion where the abortion was 
permitted by law and the required consent was 
lawfully given. 
(2) Criminal homicide is murder in the 
first and second degree, manslaughter, 
negligent homicide, or automobile homicide. 
9. Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-202 (l)(c),(e), and (k) 
(1978) (Supp. 1988): 
Murder in the first degree. 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder 
in the first degree if the actor 
intentionally or knowingly causes the death 
of another under any of the following 
circumstances: 
(c) The actor knowingly created a great 
risk of death to a person other than the 
victim and the actor. 
(e) The homicide was committed for the 
purpose of avoiding or preventing an arrest 
of the defendant or another by a peace 
officer acting under color of legal authority 
or for the purpose of effecting the 
defendant's or another's escape from lawful 
custody. 
(k) The victim is or has been a peace 
officer, law enforcement officer, executive 
officer, prosecuting officer, jailer, prison 
official, firefighter, judge or other court 
official, juror, probation officer, or parole 
officer, and the victim is either on duty or 
the homicide is based on, is caused by, or is 
related to that official position, and the 
actor knew or reasonably should have known 
that the victim holds or has held that 
official position. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Donald Arthur Farquharson, was originally 
charged with Attempted Murder in the first degree, a first degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. SS 76-4-101 (1978); 76-5-
201, 76-5-202(l)(c), (e), and (k) (1978) (Supp. 1988), on June 
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23, 1987 (Record [hereinafter R.] at 3-4). After federal charges 
in Missouri* of bank robbery and transporting a stolen vehicle 
across state lines were resolved, defendant was returned to Utah. 
On May 31, 1988, an Amended Information was filed against 
defendant charging Attempted Murder in the first degree, and 
Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1978) (R. at 5-6). During trial, a Second 
Amended Information was filed charging the same two counts but 
including additional statutory language from the Aggravated 
Assault statute (R. at 94-96 and Transcript of Trial on September 
26-27, 1988 [hereinafter T.] at 213-14). 
Defendant was tried by a jury on September 26 and 27, 
1988, in the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Beaver 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Judge J. Philip Eves, 
District Judge, presiding (R. at 140-41). At the conclusion of 
the trial, defendant was convicted of Attempted Murder in the 
first degree (R. at 134-35). Defendant was sentenced by Judge 
Eves to a term of five years to life in the Utah State Prison 
with an additional term of five years to be served consecutively 
based on the firearm enhancement provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-3-203 (1978) (Supp. 1988). Restitution was also ordered (R. 
at 144-47). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant is a Canadian citizen who entered the United 
States in April of 1987. (T. at 219)• Shortly after defendant's 
arrival in the United States, he committed an armed bank robbery 
and stole an automobile in Springfield, Missouri, and proceeded 
to drive the stolen vehicle westward, across state lines. (T. at 
219-220). -On June 19, 1987, defendant arrived at an auto repair 
garage in Beaver City, Utah, and approached the attendant about 
repairing the transmission of the stolen vehicle. (T. at 52, 
221). 
When the attendant told him that the transmission 
mechanic was out to lunch, defendant became angry, walked across 
the street, and offered to give the car to some individuals if 
they would transport him and his luggage to the bus station, 
which they agreed to do. (T. at 53-54). The garage attendant 
considered defendant's actions to be unusual, so he reported the 
incident to the Beaver County Sheriff's office, and deputy 
sheriff Raymond Goodwin responded to investigate. (T. at 56-57). 
The officer checked the vehicle identification number and 
verified that the automobile had been stolen. (T. at 58). The 
officer then took the garage attendant with him and together they 
located the defendant sitting in a booth in a small 
restaurant/service station several blocks away. (T. at 58, 222). 
The officer entered the cafe, approached defendant, and 
asked him to exit the cafe with him. (T. at 81, 223). Once 
outside the cafe, the defendant threw his wallet and a driving 
glove in the officer's face and then jumped the officer in an 
attempt to take possession of his police weapon. (T. at 82, 
224). Failing in his attempt to take the officer's weapon, the 
defendant ran back into the restaurant, and the officer followed 
after him. (T. at 84, 226). The defendant proceeded to the 
booth where he had been sitting, and reached into his duffel bag, 
which contained four guns of various types, three of which were 
loaded. (T\ at 146, 226-228)• Deputy Goodwin ordered the 
defendant to leave the bags alone, but defendant ignored the 
commands and drew a fully loaded .38 caliber handgun from the 
duffel bag, and turned the gun in the direction of the officer. 
(T. at 85, 89, 96, 134). The officer then fired three shots, two 
of which struck the defendant's left arm and wrist, and the third 
pierced the defendant's arm and entered the left side of the 
defendant's chest. (T. at 85, 238-241). Defendant was then 
transported by ambulance to a local hospital where he received 
emergency treatment. (T. at 237, 238). 
Defendant asserts that the evidence presented at trial 
was insufficient to convict based on defendant's testimony that 
he did not intend to use the weapon on the police officer but 
rather he intended to commit suicide. (T. at 224, 225 and Brief 
of Appellant [hereinafter Br. of App.] at 8, 9). 
Shortly after the shooting incident on June 19, 1987, 
defendant mailed a letter to Officer Raymond Goodwin stating: "I 
would not have shot you or anyone else there. I was just trying 
to escape." Plaintiff's exhibit 22 (emphasis added). 
An emergency medical technician, testifying for the 
defense, stated that the defendant (when asked by a doctor what 
he was doing) said "he was trying to shoot someone's head off." 
(T. at 205). However, the witness wasn't sure whether the 
defendant stated that he wanted to shoot 'my' or 'his' head off. 
(T. at 205). On cross examination the witness testified that 
her initial impression, until recently discussing the case, was 
that the defendant said that he wanted to shoot 'his' [the 
officer's] head off. (T. at 206).1 
Shortly after defendant's medical recovery, he was 
convicted in a United States District Court on charges of bank 
robbery and taking a stolen vehicle across state lines, and 
sentenced to a term in federal prison. (T. at 219-220). 
Defendant was brought from the federal prison to Beaver County 
where he was tried in the instant case on charges of attempted 
murder in the first degree and aggravated assault. 
At the trial in Beaver County, defense counsel asked 
the defendant to remove his clothing and show to the jury the 
scars he had acquired as a result of his bullet wounds. (T. at 
2 
238, 239). The court sustained an objection to the showing of 
defendant's scars, and defense counsel did not take exception to 
the ruling. (T. at 239). The context of the objection, as found 
in the court record, is instructive: 
A. [DEFENDANT:] All I know is it was one 
of the EMTs. And the person answered that in 
court yesterday. 
Appellant's brief at page 6, paragraph 3, reads: "Emergency 
medical technicians . . . testified that the Defendant told them 
to let him die and that he was 'trying to blow his brains out.'" 
The reference to "his brains" is misleading in this context. 
When the witness used the word "his" in her testimony, she was 
referring to the police officer. She was not sure whether 
defendant said he wanted to "his" (the officer's) brains out or 
"my" (defendant's) brains out. (T. at 205-10). 
2 
Contrary to the statement in Appellant's Brief at page 7, 
paragraph 3, defendant's attempt to show his wounds was not made 
in connection with a discussion of the relative positions of the 
officer and defendant at the time of the shooting. The testimony 
of defendant regarding the location of his wounds followed 
testimony of what he had said to the medical personnel and 
preceded a hypothetical question of how defendant would have shot 
the officer if he had intended to. (T. at 238-41). 
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Q. [BY MR. CHRISTIANSEN:] Okay. And I 
realize that it might be embarrassing, but 
since we are in court, can you tell them what 
you answered. 
A. Excuse my language, ladies. I said I 
wanted to blow my fucking head off. 
Q. Okay. I'11 now — 
If I can have a moment, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Certainly. 
Q. BY MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Can you tell us 
now in detail where your wounds were. 
Perhaps you'd like to remove your jacket and 
show the jury — do you have scars from those 
wounds still? 
A. Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: I don't think it's necessary that 
we see scars. 
MR. KANELL: I object, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q. BY MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Tell us where 
they were -- where the shells or the bullets 
entered your body, and where they left. 
(T. at 238-239). Subsequent to the above dialogue, defendant 
gave a detailed explanation of the nature of the three bullet 
wounds and the entry and exit points of each of the three 
bullets. (T. at 239-241). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Evidence presented at trial was sufficient to sustain 
the jury's verdict convicting defendant of attempted murder in 
the first degree. The appellate court is obliged to accept the 
version of the facts which supports the jury verdict, and 
defendant's contrary testimony that he did not intend to shoot 
the police officer but rather intended to commit suicide is not 
sufficient to warrant reversal. 
The trial court did not commit error in refusing to 
permit the defendant to show his scars to the jury. Defendant 
was permitted to point to the location and describe in detail 
each of his bullet wounds. To allow defendant to remove his 
clothing and show his scars to the jury would be cumulative and 
superfluous-and would have no evidentiary value except the hoped-
for emotional impact on the jury. Furthermore, even if the trial 
court did commit error in refusing to allow defendant to show his 
scars, this supposed error must necessarily be considered 
harmless, for the jury would surely have reached the same verdict 
regardless of such evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS 
SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE JURY'S VERDICT 
CONVICTING DEFENDANT OF ATTEMPTED MURDER IN 
THE FIRST DEGREE. 
The Utah State Supreme Court has repeatedly declared 
that jury convictions will not be reversed for insufficiency of 
the evidence unless the evidence adduced at trial is so 
"'inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime of which he was convicted.'" State v. 
Grueber, No. 870532-CA, Slip Opinion at 10 (Utah App. June 2, 
1989), quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), 
superseded by rule in the context of bench trials by State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987); see also State v. Cantu, 750 
P.2d 591, 593 (Utah 1988). All evidence presented at trial, and 
inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, must be reviewed in the 
light most favorable to the jury verdict. Grueber, Slip Op. at 
10, citing Petree, 659 P.2d at 444. Hence, "contradictory 
testimony alone is not sufficient to disturb a jury verdict." 
State v. Watts, 675 P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 1983). 
In the present case, the trial record is replete with 
evidence supporting the jury's verdict. Defendant admitted at 
trial that he engaged in a scuffle with the police officer, 
intending to take possession of the officer's police weapon. (T. 
at 226). Failing to take possession of the weapon, defendant 
proceeded into the restaurant, reached into a duffel bag filled 
with loaded weapons, withdrew a loaded .38 caliber pistol, turned 
the weapon on the officer, and was defeated only the officer's 
defensive fire. (T. at 85, 89, 96, 134, 146, 226-228). Such was 
the direct testimony of Deputy Sheriff Raymond Goodwin, as well 
as Catalina Adkins, an eye witness to the crime. 
The testimony of Deputy Goodwin established that 
defendant was intending to fire on the officer. Deputy Goodwin 
testified: 
A. He grabbed Exhibit No. 4 [the duffel bag] 
and unzipped the bag; reached inside of it 
with his right hand. He was turned sideways 
in front of me, and I commanded the defendant 
several times to get his hand out of the bag 
and get his hands back up. 
The defendant completely ignored me, as 
if he couldn't even hear me. As I watched 
the bag in his hands, I observed his right 
hand to come out, grasping a revolver. And 
as it came out of the bag, he made a whirling 
motion, and he had ahold [sic] of the gun by 
the grips, and the gun started in my 
direction. 
(T. at 85). This testimony was bolstered by the evidence 
presented by the witness, Catalina Adkins. She was a cook in the 
cafe where the shooting occurred and saw defendant pull the gun 
out of the bag and saw him turn to face Deputy Goodwin. (T. at 
131 and 134-37). 
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Evidence also established that defendant had several 
guns in the bag, most of them loaded. (T. at 145-47). Defendant 
testified that he had all of these weapons with him to commit 
suicide if he were close to being captured (T. at 255-57). To 
expect a group of reasonable people such as the jury to believe 
that defendant required a bag filled with loaded weapons to carry 
out his alleged suicide attempt is incredible. 
Defendant claims that he did not point the gun at the 
officer; that he intended instead to put the gun to his mouth and 
commit suicide. (T. at 224, 225, 233). Defendant also 
introduced several witnesses who testified that after defendant 
had been shot he made statements to the effect that he wanted to 
die, that he wished he could die, etc.. (T. at 185, 187, 195). 
But once again, "the existence of contradictory evidence or 
conflicting inferences does not warrant disturbing the jury's 
verdict." State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 1982). On 
conflicting evidence, the appellate court is always obliged to 
accept the version of the facts which supports the jury verdict, 
even if a defendant recites a version of the facts which, if 
believed, would support a contrary verdict. Icl. at 93. Moreover, 
the appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of 
the jury in evaluating the credibility of appellant's testimony 
or the weight to be given conflicting evidence. Grueber, Slip 
Op. at 11; see also State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811, 813 (Utah 
1977). 
It is also interesting to note that defendant sent a 
letter to Deputy Goodwin while defendant was awaiting resolution 
of his federal charges in Missouri. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 22 
[hereinafter P-22]). In this letter, defendant told the officer 
that he would not have shot him and that defendant "was just 
trying to escape." (P-22). Defendant tried to explain the 
letter at trial by saying that he meant suicide when he spoke of 
trying to escape (T. at 254-55). Apparently, the jury did not 
accept this later definition that defendant gave his words but, 
instead, chose to give the word "escape" its normal meaning. It 
was not inherently improbable for the jury to believe that 
defendant wanted to escape from the officer by shooting him and 
leaving the area. Indeed, defendant's allegation, presented over 
a year later, at trial, that he wanted to commit suicide is an 
unbelievable theory. The jury was correct in rejecting the 
improbability of defendant's testimony. 
Clearly in the instant case, there is substantial 
credible evidence to support defendant's conviction, and the 
evidence is not so lacking and insubstantial that reasonable men 
could not have reached the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN REFUSING TO 
PERMIT THE DEFENDANT TO SHOW HIS SCARS TO THE 
JURY. 
The Utah Supreme Court has declared on many occasions 
that it is within the sound discretion of the trial court to 
determine the admissibility of evidence. The trial court's 
decision with respect thereto should not be interfered with 
unless an abuse of discretion resulting in manifest error is 
shown. See e.g., State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1352 (Utah 
1977), cert, den. Pierre v. Utah, 439 U.S. 882, 99 S.Ct. 219, 58 
L.Ed.2d 194-(1978), citing State v. Renzo, 21 Utah 2d 205, 443 
P. 2d 392 (1968). The defense asserts that the defendant should 
have been allowed to show his scars to the jury because such 
evidence would have provided some indication of the direction the 
defendant was facing when the officer fired on him, allegedly 
supporting defendant's claim that the position he was standing 
would have made it "difficult if not impossible to turn in the 
direction of the officer." (T. at 307; Br. of App. at 6, 9). 
The State does not dispute that the positioning of the 
bullet wounds is "relevant" (as defined by Utah R. Evid. 401) in 
determining the direction the defendant was facing. However Rule 
403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states that: "Although 
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence." (emphasis added) In the 
present case, the defendant was permitted to point to the 
location and describe in detail each of the bullet wounds, and 
defendant's testimony in that regard was completely undisputed by 
3 
the State. (T. at 239-41). Allowing defendant to remove his 
clothing and show his scars to the jury would have been 
Contrary to the statement in defendant's brief (Br. of App. at 
page 9, paragraph 3), the officer did not testify that the 
defendant was "facing" him at the time the shots were fired, but 
rather that the defendant was "turned sideways in front of me . 
. [and] made a swing with the gun in a swinging motion toward 
me." (T. at 85, 89, 96). 
cumulative and inflammatory and would have had no evidentiary 
value except the hoped-for emotional impact on the jury. See 
State v. Wells, 603 P.2d 810, 813 (1979) (Court ruled that 
photographs of a homicide victim had no evidentiary value because 
the evidence depicted was already before the jury through the 
testimony of the medical examiner and the evidence was not 
contested by respondent; therefore the photographs were 
cumulative and superfluous). In the present case, the 
information that might have been put before the jury through a 
viewing of defendant's scars was accurately and thoroughly 
presented through means not accompanied by potential prejudice. 
But notwithstanding the above, even if the trial judge 
had committed error in refusing to allow the defendant to show 
his scars to the jury, such an error does not require reversal 
unless substantial prejudice has occurred as a result. State v. 
Hutchison, 655 P.2d 635, 636 (Utah 1982); State v. Pierre, 572 
P.2d 1338, 1352 (Utah 1977), cert, den. Pierre v. Utah, 439 U.S. 
882, 99 S.Ct. 219, 58 L.Ed.2d 194 (1978). Rule 30 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure states in part that: "(a) any error, 
defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the 
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded." The mandate 
of this statute as interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court is that 
the Court will 'not upset the verdict of a jury merely because 
some error or irregularity may have occurred, but will do so only 
if it is something substantial and prejudicial in the sense that 
there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence there would 
have been a different result.' Hutchison, 655 P.2d at 636 
quoting State v. Urias, 609 P.2d 1326 (Utah 1980). 
1 C 
In the present case, it is inconceivable that the jury 
could have reached a different verdict had the defendant been 
allowed to show his scars. The jury deliberation, from the final 
closing argument, to the reading of the verdict, took less than 
one hour. (T. at 313-314). Plainly, the jury disbelieved the 
defendant's suicide defense. 
Furthermore, defendant asserts that the evidentiary 
value of the scars would have been to reinforce in the jury's 
mind the positions of the officer and the defendant when the 
shots were fired. (Br. of App. at 9). But if this were true, 
then the showing of defendant's scars would have tended to weigh 
in favor of the jury verdict rather than against it. Defendant's 
bullet wounds were located in his left arm and left chest, 
indicating that his left shoulder was turned toward the officer 
at the time of the incident. This comports with the assertions 
of the defendant that he was standing at a "a 90 degree angle 
from Officer Goodwin . . . at the least, a 45 degree angle 
between me and Officer Goodwin." (T. at 231). This angle is not 
disputed by the testimony of the deputy who stated that 
defendant's body was directed at an angle away from the officer 
but that defendant was turning toward the deputy with the gun. 
(T. at 85). A jury carefully considering the above, would have 
concluded that, even if defendant had been standing at the 
maximum 90 degrees in relation to the officer, defendant would 
have been able to direct his weapon at the officer using either 
his left or his right hand, without turning his body in the 
slightest. This is completely contrary to defense counsel's 
statement that defendant's position relative to the officer would 
have made i£ "difficult if not impossible to turn in the 
direction of the officer." (T. at 6; Br. of App. at 307). A 
comprehensive demonstration of the above scenario in the 
courtroom would have served to reinforce rather than contravene 
the jury's verdict. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to 
convict defendant of attempted murder. Defendant's suicide 
defense was simply not believed by the jury. Showing defendant's 
scars to the jury would have been cumulative and unnecessary, 
and, had such evidence been allowed, it would not have had a 
substantial chance of changing the jury's verdict. Respondent, 
therefore, respectfully requests that this court affirm the 
jury's verdict of conviction in this case. 
j 
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